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NCAA V. N.J.: NEW JERSEY ROLLS THE DICE ON A
TENTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE
PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR SPORTS
PROTECTION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Football League (“NFL”), advertisers, and fans
spend enormous amounts of money on the Super Bowl each year,
which arguably has the effect of stimulating the economy on a na-
tional scale.1  This claim may be true, given that Super Bowl XLVIII
resulted in $210 million in direct spending for the Greater New
York City metropolitan area when MetLife Stadium in East Ruther-
ford, New Jersey hosted the 2014 matchup.2  One state in particular
recognizes a yearly economic boost as a result of the Super Bowl
despite never having hosted the event.3  Nevada, notwithstanding
federal legislation prohibiting sports wagering, has consistently
benefitted from the Super Bowl because gambling and betting enti-
ties across the state are legally authorized to implement and carry
out sports wagering schemes.4  Nevada’s gambling regime enables
individuals to place bets on the outcome of the Super Bowl and on
any live sporting event taking place across the country both profes-
1. See Super Bowl by the Numbers: 2013 Edition, DAVERAMSEY.COM, http://www
.daveramsey.com/blog/2013-super-bowl-by-the-numbers (last visited Jan. 29, 2014)
(discussing revenue generated by various entities during Super Bowl XLVII).
2. See PwC US Anticipates Super Bowl XLVIII to Generate Over $210 Million in Di-
rect Spending for the New York/New Jersey Area, PWC (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.pwc
.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/pwc-super-bowl-press-release.jhtml (projecting
that Super Bowl XLVIII’s financial impact on New Jersey and New York area from
direct spending will be about $210 million).
3. See Frank Pingue, Ravens’ Super Bowl Win a Boon For Vegas Profit, REUTERS
(Feb. 4, 2013, 7:50PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/us-nfl-super
bowl-vegas-idUSBRE91401N20130205 (“Nevada sports books kept a combined $7.2
million from Super Bowl bets, or 7.3 percent of the total wagers placed, unaudited
figures showed. That was up from the $5 million they kept last year and the highest
since pocketing nearly $13 million in 2007.”); Hannah Dreier, Super Bowl 2014:
Football Betting More Popular Than Ever in Vegas, THE DELAWARE COUNTY DAILY TIMES
(Jan. 27, 2014, 3:38PM), http://www.delcotimes.com/20140127/super-bowl-2014-
football-betting-more-popular-than-ever-in-vegas (stating that fans “bet an unprece-
dented $99 million on the Super Bowl” in 2013).
4. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 3701-3704 (2006) [hereinafter “PASPA”].  PASPA currently provides for an ex-
emption for the states of Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware. See id. § 3704
(listing states exempt from PASPA).
(149)
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sionally and collegiately.5  As a result, Nevada capitalizes on live
sporting events by authorizing sports wagering, and in doing so,
generates revenue for the state.6  Sports fans wagered a record
$119.4 million on Super Bowl XLVIII and, as a result of the Seattle
Seahawks’ 43-8 surprising victory over the favored Denver Broncos,
Nevada sportsbooks reaped a record $19.7 million in profits from
that event.7
Recognizing the impact sports wagering can have on a state’s
bottom lines, state legislators have introduced legislation that
would reverse prior state prohibitions on sports betting.8  Such at-
tempts directly contravene the purpose of the Professional and Am-
ateur Sports Protection Act (“PASPA”), a federal law that prohibits
state-sanctioned sports wagering.9  Nonetheless, state officials have
continued to argue that the federal law is invalid.10  Recently, how-
ever, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dealt a
blow to challengers of the law in NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey.11  In
this case, the court upheld the constitutionality of PASPA and sub-
sequently enjoined New Jersey from enacting a sports gambling li-
5. See Sports Wagering, AMERICAN GAMING ASSOCIATION, http://www.american-
gaming.org/industry-resources/research/fact-sheets/sports-wagering (last visited
Jan. 30, 2014) (“More bets are placed on the Super Bowl than on any other single
day sporting event of the year, however more is wagered during the first four days
of the men’s March Madness tournament.”).
6. See id. (stating that in 2012 Nevada generated gross revenue of $170 million
directly from sports wagering).  “The Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority
estimated that the 2012 Super Bowl weekend produced $106.2 million in non-
gaming economic impact and attracted 310,000 visitors.” Id.
7. See Fans Bet Record $119M on Super Bowl, ESPN.COM (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:37AM),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs/2013/story/_/id/10399019/super-bowl-xlviii-
fans-bet-record-119m-game-nevada-casinos (reporting record profits as a result wa-
gering on Super Bowl XLVIII).  “Denver Broncos were a 2.5-point favorite, but the
Seattle Seahawks took the championship 43-8.” Id. (suggesting record profits re-
sulted from Seattle Seahawks upset over Denver Broncos).
8. See Patrick McGreevy, California Legislators Again Consider Legalizing Sports
Betting, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 7, 2013, 8:00AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes
.com/california-politics/2013/02/california-lawmakers-again-consider-legalizing-
sports-betting.html (reporting state officials’ discussions to draft legislations legal-
izing sports gambling in California); see also Melanie Batley, More States Want In on
Sports Betting to Close Budget Gaps, NEWSMAX (Mar. 28, 2013, 12:13PM), http://www
.newsmax.com/Newsfront/states-sports-betting-budget/2013/03/28/id/496770
(describing attempts by Illinois, California, and New Jersey legislatures to legalize
sports betting in effort to close budgets gaps).
9. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2006) (prohibiting states from licensing or au-
thorizing sports gambling regimes).
10. For a further discussion of the various claims asserted by opponents re-
garding the constitutionality of PASPA, see infra notes 108 to 146 and accompany- R
ing text.
11. See generally NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 240-41 (3d Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) [hereinafter “NCAA II”].
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censing scheme.12  New Jersey appealed the decision to the
Supreme Court; however, the Supreme Court denied New Jersey’s
Petition for writ of certiorari.13  Consequently, the holding prevents
any state within the jurisdiction of the Third Circuit from enacting
any legislation that would legalize wagering on sports.14  Thus,
NCAA has potential broad implications for all states going forward
as they seek to generate revenue in an effort to minimize budget
shortfalls.15
This Casenote analyzes the Third Circuit’s decision in NCAA
and asserts that the court failed to consider how PASPA violates the
Tenth Amendment, thereby ignoring a way in which the legislation
is unconstitutional.16  Part II describes the passage of the Sports Wa-
gering Law in New Jersey and the events leading up to the civil
action filed against the state.17  Part III provides a background to
sports gambling and the passage of PASPA.18  Part IV summarizes
the Third Circuit’s decision in NCAA and focuses on the court’s
analysis of the anti-commandeering principle and issues pertaining
to sovereignty of the states.19  Part V provides an alternative inter-
pretation of the constitutional challenges to PASPA asserted by New
Jersey.20  Finally, Part VI discusses the impact of NCAA on the ability
of states to enact sports wagering laws.21
12. See NCAA II, 134 S. Ct. at 240-41 (holding PASPA constitutional and en-
joining New Jersey from implementing sports wagering scheme in the state).
13. See Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (denying writ of certiorari);
see Christie v. NCAA, 2014 WL 572929, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2014)
(No. 13-967) (requesting United States Supreme Court grant petition for certio-
rari). See also Ryan Hutchins, Chris Christie Appeals Sports Betting Case to U.S. Supreme
Court, NJ.COM (Feb. 18, 2014, 8:37PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/
2014/02/chris_christie_appeals_sports_betting_case_to_us_supreme_court.html
(reporting Governor Chris Christie appealed decision of Third Circuit to U.S. Su-
preme Court).
14. For a further discussion of the impact of the ruling in NCAA, see infra
notes 179 to 197 and accompanying text. R
15. For a further discussion of the effects of NCAA on all states, see infra notes
179 to 197 and accompanying text. R
16. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s decision, see infra notes 95 to 146 R
and accompanying text.
17. For discussion of the events leading up to the passage of the New Jersey
Sports Gambling Law, which legalized sports gambling, and the suit filed against
New Jersey, see infra notes 22 to 43 and accompanying text. R
18. For a discussion on sports wagering and the passage of PASPA, see infra
notes 44 to 59 and accompanying text. R
19. For a detailed discussion of the court’s decision in NCAA, see infra notes
95 to 146 and accompanying text. R
20. For a discussion of the court’s flawed reasoning regarding the anti-com-
mandeering principle, see infra notes 147 to 178 and accompanying text. R
21. For a further discussion of the impact of the ruling in NCAA, see infra
notes 179 to 196 and accompanying text. R
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II. FACTS
In 2010, the New Jersey legislature agreed to place a legisla-
tively referred constitutional amendment regarding the legalization
of sports gambling on the ballot for voter approval in the Novem-
ber 2011 election.22  On November 9, 2011, over 60 percent of New
Jersey voters approved the referendum, which granted the legisla-
ture the authority to amend the constitution to allow sports wager-
ing.23  Shortly after the referendum was approved, the legislature
passed a bill granting the state authority to issue licenses to the
state’s casinos and racetracks, permitting gambling on live sporting
events.24  Governor Chris Christie immediately signed the bill into
law, and it became known as the Sports Wagering Law.25  On Octo-
22. New Jersey’s “Senate and Assembly guaranteed that a referendum
[would] appear on the November ballot asking voters whether they want[ed] to
amend New Jersey’s constitution by legalizing sports betting in the state.” See The
Associated Press, N.J. Legislature Approves Legalizing Sports Betting Question on Election
Ballot, NJ.COM (Dec. 13, 2010, 7:53PM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
2010/12/nj_voters_to_decide_on_legaliz.html. In order to amend or add a new
provision to a state constitution, state legislatures typically pass a legislative propo-
sal, which is then placed on the ballot for approval by the state’s electorate. See 16
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 29 (2014).  An amendment to New Jersey’s consti-
tution may be proposed in the Senate or the General Assembly. See N.J. CONST.
art. 9, § 1.  If the proposed amendment is approved by three-fifths of all the mem-
bers of both the Senate and General Assembly, the proposal is submitted to the
voters of New Jersey for approval. See id.  If the amendment is approved by a ma-
jority of legally registered voters of New Jersey, the proposed amendment is added
to the constitution within thirty days after the election, unless otherwise provided
by the amendment. See N.J. CONST. art. 9, § 6.
23. See Donald Wittkowski, New Jersey Voters Approve At Casino and Race Tracks by
Wide Margin, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Nov. 9, 2011, 9:54AM), http://www.pressof
atlanticcity.com/politics/new-jersey-voters-approve-sports-betting-at-casinos-and-
race/article_ad60482c-0a86-11e1-a614-001cc4c03286.html (reporting New Jersey
voters, by margin of two-to-one, approved referendum to legalize sports betting at
Atlantic City casinos and state’s horse-racing tracks).  The ballot measure stated
the following:
Shall the amendment to Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 2 of the Con-
stitution of the State of New Jersey, agreed to by the Legislature, provid-
ing that it shall be lawful for the Legislature to authorize by law wagering
at casinos or gambling houses in Atlantic City and at racetracks, in-person
or through an account wagering system, on the results of professional,
certain college, or amateur sport or athletic events, be approved?
State of N.J., Assemb. Con. Res. No. 98, 214th Legislature, Proposed Feb. 8, 2010.
24. See 2011 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 13 (Assembly No. 4385); NJ Lawmakers
Approve Sports Betting Bill, NEW JERSEY 101.5 (Jan. 10, 2012, 1:15AM), http://nj1015
.com/nj-lawmakers-approve-sports-betting-bill/ (referencing passage of sports wa-
gering bill by New Jersey legislature).
25. See Sports Wagering Law, N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12a-1 to 5:12a-6 (2013); see
also Sarah Coffey, N.J. Moves Towards Legal Sports Betting This Fall, in Time for NFL
Season, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (May 25, 2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/nj-moves-towards-legal-sports-betting-fall-time-nfl-season (describing enact-
ment of New Jersey’s Sports Wagering Law).
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ber 15, 2012, New Jersey promulgated sports wagering regulations,
which enacted a scheme through which New Jersey could “sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license and/or authorize sports
gambling.”26
In August 2012, prior to the promulgation of the regulations,
the National Collegiate Athletic Associations (“NCAA”), National
Basketball Association (“NBA”), NFL, National Hockey League
(“NHL”), and Office of the Commissioner of Baseball doing busi-
ness as Major League Baseball (“MLB”) (collectively “the Leagues”)
filed an action in the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey.27  The Leagues sought to enjoin New Jersey from imple-
menting the Sports Wagering Law.28  The Leagues asserted the
Sports Wagering Law violated PASPA, and was therefore, pre-
empted by federal law.29  Three days after filing the Complaint, the
Leagues filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing PASPA was
a permissible exercise of Congress’ powers pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause and that it did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the Tenth Amendment.30  In response, the defendants
filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming the Leagues did not have stand-
ing as private entities to enforce PASPA.31  On December 21, 2012,
the District Court issued an opinion concluding that the Leagues
had made an adequate showing of standing; accordingly, the court
denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.32  In January 2013, the
United States filed a Notice of Intervention, whereby the court
26. See NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 556 (D.N.J. 2013) [hereinafter
NCAA I] (describing regulations promulgated by New Jersey).
27. See NCAA I, 926 F. Supp. at 554 (summarizing background of case).
28. See id. (discussing plaintiffs’ motives in filing action against New Jersey).
29. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NCAA v. Christie,
2012 WL 3171566 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. CV124947) (“In clear violation of PASPA,
and in contravention of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2, New Jersey has enacted the Sports Gambling Law.”).
30. See generally Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
and, If Necessary, to Preserve the Status Quo, a Preliminary Injunction at 7, NCAA
v. Christie, 2012 WL 3964728, (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 12-CV-04947). See also U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
31. The defendants’ brief stated the following:
But to establish their standing as private entities to enforce this federal
law, the Leagues cannot merely point to a private right of action in the
statute; they must also plausibly allege that they will suffer a concrete and
imminent ‘injury-in-fact’ that is ‘fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant.’
Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) at 1, NCAA v. Christie, 2012 WL 3964552 (D.N.J. 2012)
(No. 3:12-cv-04947).
32. See NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2012 WL 6698684, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec.
21, 2012).
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granted leave to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to file a brief
regarding the constitutionality of PASPA.33
In late February of 2013, the District Court issued an opinion
granting the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, thereby
granting the Leagues and the United States a permanent injunc-
tion.34  First, the court concluded that PASPA “is a rational expres-
sion of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause” and the
presence of a grandfather clause granting exemptions to four states
neither deprives the statute of constitutionality, nor undermines ra-
tional basis review.35  Second, the court determined that PASPA did
not violate the Tenth Amendment since the statute did not com-
mandeer New Jersey into regulating private action, as it requires no
affirmative action on the part of the state.36  Third, the court held
that PASPA does not violate the Due Process Clause and Equal Pro-
tection Principles because “PASPA [does] not offend rational basis
review where Congress . . . has determined ‘that all such sports gam-
bling is harmful,’ but ‘has no wish to apply [PASPA] retroac-
tively.’”37  Finally, the court rejected New Jersey’s challenge to
PASPA on “Equal Footing” grounds since New Jersey “[was] inap-
propriately situated to make an argument that it is being treated
differently than the original colonies pursuant to the Equal Footing
Doctrine.”38
After the District Court issued its opinion, New Jersey filed an
appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
33. See NCAA I, 926 F. Supp. at 553 (detailing process whereby DOJ inter-
vened and describing all other subsequent filings).
34. See id. at 579 (granting plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and issu-
ing permanent injunction).
35. See id. at 554-55 (determining PASPA does not violate Commerce Clause).
36. See id. at 561-73 (discussing anti-commandeering principles and its appli-
cability to PASPA).
37. See id. at 573-76 (stating “[t]he reliance interests of the excepted states,
coupled with the government’s legitimate interest in stemming the tide of legal-
ized sports gambling, provide ample support for upholding PASPA pursuant to
rational basis review.”).
38. See id. at 577 (describing rationale for concluding PASPA does not violate
Equal Footing Doctrine).
Equal-Footing Doctrine is a principle of Constitutional law that mandates
that new states be admitted to the Union as equals of the existing states,
in terms of power, sovereignty, and freedom. States must be admitted on
an equal footing in the sense that Congress may not exact conditions
solely as a tribute for admission, but it may, in the enabling or admitting
acts or subsequently impose requirements that would be or are valid and
effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after admission.
Equal Footing Doctrine, USLEGAL, http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/equal-foot-
ing-doctrine/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (summarizing Equal Footing Doctrine).
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cuit, challenging the District Court’s decision.39  In a two-to-one de-
cision, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment and
concluded that PASPA was valid law, thus preempting New Jersey’s
Sports Wagering Law.40  By holding PASPA constitutional, the court
stated “[t]he law neither exceeds Congress’ enumerated powers
nor violates any principle of federalism implicit in the Tenth
Amendment or anywhere else in our Constitutional structure.”41
Judge Thomas Vanaskie concurred in part and dissented in part,
stating, “PASPA prohibits states from authorizing sports gambling
and thereby directs how states must treat such activity” and is a “con-
gressional directive” that “violates the principles of federalism.”42
After the opinion was issued, New Jersey filed a petition for a re-
hearing before the full Third Circuit; the petition was denied.43
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A Brief History of Sports Gambling in the United States
Different forms of gambling have been a part of American cul-
ture since the Revolutionary War.44  Sports gambling, in particular,
39. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d 208, 208 (3d Cir. 2013) (appealing decision of Dis-
trict Court).
40. See id. at 240-41 (concluding PASPA is constitutional and holding Sports
Wagering Law conflicts with federal law).
41. See id. at 240 (holding nothing in PASPA violates Constitution).
42. See id. at 241 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (detailing reasons for dissenting
from opinion).
43. See Chris Sieroty, U.S. Supreme Court is Last Option in New Jersey Sports Betting
Case, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Nov. 18, 2013, 5:24PM), http://www
.reviewjournal.com/business/us-supreme-court-last-option-new-jersey-sports-bet-
ting-case (reporting that Third Circuit denied request for rehearing of case).  The
opinion in NCAA was issued by a three-judge panel sitting in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. See id.  When a party to a proceeding does
not prevail, they have the option to file a petition for a rehearing before a panel or
en banc within 14 days (45 days in civil cases in which the United States is a party).
See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).
A petition for rehearing must specify: (a) the point(s) of law or fact that
the panel overlooked or misapprehended and that affected the outcome
of the appeal; (b) the pivotal effect of a new precedential decision or
statute; or (c) the issue of exceptional importance that calls out for en
banc attention.
The Bar Association for the Third Federal Circuit, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
THIRD CIRCUIT PRACTICE GUIDE (2012), available at http://thirdcircuitbar.org/doc-
uments/third-circuit-bar-practice-guide.pdf (detailing rules and procedures that
apply for cases filed in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit).
44. See Chil Woo, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting The Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 571-72 (2013) (discussing
use of lotteries to finance Revolutionary War and colonial governments).  During
the Revolutionary War, the Board of Treasury established a national lottery to raise
funds to support the Continental Army. See Richard McGowan, STATE LOTTERIES
AND LEGALIZED GAMBLING: PAINLESS REVENUE OR PAINFUL MIRAGE 10 (Praeger ed.,
7
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gained traction in the late nineteenth century as professional base-
ball became increasingly popular and as illegal activity flourished
through organized networks of underground bookmakers, or
“bookies.”45  Although most religious institutions were predisposed
to view gambling as immoral, the negative impacts of sports gam-
bling did not become apparent to the general population until af-
ter the 1919 Black Sox scandal, when eight members of the Chicago
White Sox were indicted for conspiring to fix and lose games dur-
ing the 1919 World Series.46  As a result, support for sports wager-
ing quickly disappeared.47
In 1951, over thirty years after the Black Sox scandal, Congress
passed legislation removing restrictions on sports betting and im-
posed a ten percent tax on all sports bets made within the United
States.48  In execution, this tax actually only affected Nevada, as it
was the only state to have authorized sports gambling.49  In 1961,
Congress passed the Wire Act in an effort to prevent the prolifera-
tion of interstate gambling, “leaving states to regulate and control
aspects of sports gambling as they saw fit within their borders.”50
1994) (discussing Congress’s financing of Revolutionary War).  Shortly after the
establishment of a national lottery, almost every colony established their own lot-
tery scheme to fund their soldiers in the war. See id. (stating Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, New York, Vermont, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina estab-
lished lotteries to fund their troops).
45. See Woo, supra note 44, at 571-72 (detailing rise in illegal sports gambling R
in conjunction with rise of professional baseball).
46. See Douglas Linder, The Black Sox Trial: An Account, UMKC.EDU (2010),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/blacksox/blacksoxaccount.html
(recounting price-fixing scandal associated with 1919 World Series).
47. See Daniel A. Nathan, The Big Fix, LEGAL AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2004/review_nathan_marapr
04.msp (“The Black Sox Scandal was the sports crime of the 20th century. . . . [n]o
sports scandal has similarly shocked America or had such a lasting impact on its
culture.”).
48. See Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA): A Bad Bet for the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281, 287 (2011) (“Congress
imposed an annual fifty-dollar excise tax on bookmakers and a ten-percent tax on
all sports bets.  The tax only impacted Nevada, the sole state to have any form of
legalized sports betting.”).
49. See History of Sports Betting, THEBETTINGLINE.COM, http://www.thebet-
tingline.com/history-of-sports-betting.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (discussing
regulations passed by Congress legalizing sports betting and imposing tax).
50. See Woo, supra note 44, at 574 (describing Congress’s efforts to reign in R
nation-wide effects of sports betting).
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B. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(“PASPA”)
As more states considered enacting sport-related gambling re-
gimes, professional and collegiate sports leagues continued to put
pressure on Congress to pass legislation to outlaw sports wager-
ing.51  Legislators quickly became concerned that “[s]ports gam-
bling raises people’s suspicions about point-shaving and game-
fixing” and would threaten the integrity of the game.52  In re-
sponse, Congress enacted PASPA, which “prohibit[s] sports gam-
bling conducted by, or authorized under the law of, any State or
other governmental entity.”53  Specifically, PASPA makes it unlaw-
ful for any person or governmental entity to:
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize
by law or compact . . . lottery, sweepstakes, or other bet-
ting, gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly or indi-
rectly . . . on one or more competitive games in which
amateur or professional athletes participate, or are in-
tended to participate, or on one or more performances of
such athletes in such games.54
Moreover, PASPA grants the “Attorney General of the United
States, or . . . professional sports organization or amateur sports
organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of “
a violation of PASPA, the ability to file a civil action in federal court
to enjoin any person or government entity in violation of the Act.55
Additionally, PASPA does not apply to “lottery, sweepstakes, or
other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme in operation . . . dur-
ing the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31,
1990.”56  This provision has proven controversial, as it has ex-
51. See Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act-Policy Con-
cerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 8 (1992) (noting that in
1992 at least thirteen states were considering measures to legalize state-sponsored
sports betting). See S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 3 (1991) (listing individuals who testi-
fied at public hearing voicing support for legislation prohibiting sports gambling
including, but not limited to, commissioners of NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB).
52. See Bradley, supra note 51, at 7-8 (“Where sports-gambling occurs, fans R
cannot help but wonder if a missed free throw, dropped fly ball, or a missed extra
point was part of a player’s scheme to fix the game.  If sports betting is legalized,
fans will question every coaching decision and official’s call.”).
53. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, supra note 51, at 3. R
54. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2006).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1) (2006).
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empted Nevada, Oregon, Montana, and Delaware from PASPA.57
Moreover, PASPA allows casinos that had a betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme in place prior to October 2, 1991 to implement a
legal sports-gambling regime within one year of the enactment of
PASPA.58  As a result, challengers of the law scrutinize the exemp-
tions provided by PASPA, arguing that by providing these exemp-
tions the law has undermined its own premise.59
C. Prior Challenges to PASPA
1. A Statutory Interpretation of the Word “Scheme”
Prior to the enactment of PASPA, Delaware conducted multi-
game (parlay) betting on NFL games.60  Consequently, PAPSA af-
forded the state an exception with respect to the scheme in place at
the time of the law’s enactment.61  In 2009, Delaware Governor Jack
Markell signed the Sports Lottery Act into law.62  The Act author-
ized a sports betting scheme that included “single-game betting in
addition to multi-game” betting based on the “outcome of any pro-
fessional or collegiate sports event including racing . . . excluding
sporting events that involve a Delaware college or university, and
amateur or professional sporting events that involve a Delaware
team.”63  Two months after signing the Act into law, the NFL, NBA,
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a)(1). See also Bradley, supra note 51, at 9-10 (sug- R
gesting certain states had sports-betting schemes in place prior to enactment of
PASPA and “elimination of such schemes in these particular states would work a
harsh result.”).
58. See U.S.C. § 3704(a)(3).  Any casino satisfying the criteria, and that had
enacted a sports gambling scheme within one year of PASPA’s enactment, was
granted an exception to PASPA. See id.
59. See S. REP. NO. 102-248, supra note 51, at 4-5 (stating purpose of PASPA is R
“to maintain the integrity” of professional and amateur sports).  For a further dis-
cussion of the arguments suggesting that PASPA is discriminatory and allowing
certain states to carry out sports-betting schemes undermines the purpose for the
enactment, see infra notes 129-137 and accompanying text.
60. See Gambling in Delaware: Pass, punt, PASPA, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24,
2009, available at http://www.economist.com/node/14506468 (stating Delaware
had three-game “parlay” betting regime in place in 1976).
61. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 3704. See also Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v.
Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir. 2009) [hereinafter “Markell”] (describing
sports gambling scheme conducted by Delaware since 1976).  “A parlay is a single
bet that links together two or more individual wagers and is dependent on all of
those wagers winning together. . . . [i]f any of the bets in the parlay loses, the
entire parlay loses.” See Parlay, PREGAME.COM, http://pregame.com/EN/main/
sports-betting-basics/glossary/terms/parlay.html (lasted visited Feb. 3, 2014) (de-
fining parlay wagering).
62. See Sports Lottery Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4801-4824 (West 2012),
invalidated by Markell, 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
63. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4801 (West 2012), invalidated by Markell, 579
F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing statement of purpose). See also Markell, 579
10
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NHL, MLB, and NCAA sought to enjoin Delaware officials from im-
plementing provisions of the Sports Lottery Act that included
sports wagering beyond parlay betting on NFL games.64  The
Leagues claimed the sports betting schemes authorized by Dela-
ware violated PASPA.65  The District Court for the District of Dela-
ware denied the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and
stated the “Leagues had not shown a likelihood of success on the
merits.”66  The court scheduled the case for trial and the plaintiffs
filed an expedited appeal with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.67
In Office of Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell, the Third Circuit
reversed the District Court’s decision to deny the plaintiffs’ injunc-
tion.68  Delaware argued the single-game wagers authorized by the
Sports Lottery Act did not violate PAPSA since the state conducted
multi-game betting schemes on NFL games since 1976, and there-
fore qualified for an exception under PASPA.69  PASPA does not
apply to “lotter[ies], sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wa-
gering scheme in operation in a State or other governmental entity,
to the extent that the scheme was conducted by that State . . . during the
period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending August 31, 1990.”70
Delaware contended that the exception allowed it to conduct “any
sports lottery under State control . . . because it did so in 1976” and
that the word “scheme” refers to a “sports lottery under State con-
trol in which the winners of the lottery games were affiliated with
the outcome of sporting events.”71  The Third Circuit disagreed
with Delaware’s broad interpretation and stated that PASPA re-
F.3d at 296 (detailing sports betting scheme to be implemented by Sports Lottery
Act and corresponding Regulations).
64. See Markell, 579 F.3d at 295 (noting that NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB, and
NCAA sought to enjoin Delaware officials on September 1, 2009).
65. See id. at 297 (requesting that Delaware be enjoined “from commencing,
instituting, operating and maintaining a proposed ‘sports lottery’ to the extent
that such lottery permits (i) single-game sports betting, (ii) betting on sports other
than professional football, or (iii) any other sports betting scheme that was not
conducted by the State of Delaware in 1976.”).
66. See id. (stating District Court’s reason for denying Leagues’ motion).
67. See Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, C.A. No. 09–538, 2009
WL 2450284, at *1 (D. Del. 2009). See also Markell, 579 F.3d at 297 (describing
plaintiffs’ efforts to receive expedited appeal).
68. See Markell, 579 F.3d at 304 (reversing District Court’s decision).
69. See id. at 301 (discussing Delaware’s argument).
70. See Markell, 579 F.3d at 301 (outlining scope of statute’s application (quot-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 3704(a))).
71. See Markell, 579 F.3d at 301 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (detailing Delaware’s interpretation of PASPA’s exemption provision as
outlined in Delaware’s brief).
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quired the court “to determine ‘the extent’ – or degree – to which
such lottery was conducted.”72  Since Delaware conducted a betting
scheme limited to multi-game wagering on only NFL teams between
1976 and 1990, the court determined that any effort to allow single-
game betting or multi-game betting on sports contests beyond the
NFL violated PASPA.73
2. Two Failed Attempts at a Constitutional Challenge
With the exception of Markell, PASPA has only been chal-
lenged on two other occasions, both arising out of the State of New
Jersey.74  First, in 2006, the plaintiffs in Flagler v. U.S. Attorney filed a
federal civil action against the Attorney General of the United
States and the United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey,
alleging that PASPA did not fall under Congress’s Commerce
Clause powers “because the activity it prohibits stays within borders
of a single state,” and also violates the Tenth Amendment.75  How-
ever, without addressing the merits, the District Court dismissed the
case for lack of standing under the three-prong test established in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.76
In 2010, PASPA was challenged on constitutional grounds for
the second time in Interactive Media Entm’t  Gaming Ass’n v. Holder.77
In that case, the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horseman’s Association
(“N.J. Horseman’s Association”) and New Jersey State Senator Ray-
72. See id. (rejecting Delaware’s broad interpretation of PASPA’s exemption
provision).
73. See Markell, 579 F.3d at 304.  The Third Circuit held as follows:
[N]o single-game betting was ‘conducted’ by Delaware in 1976, or at any
other time during the time period that triggers the PASPA exception”
and “single-game betting was not ‘conducted’ by Delaware between 1976
and 1990, such betting is beyond the scope of the exception in
§3704(a)(1) of PASPA and thus prohibited under the statute’s plain
language.
Markell, 579 F.3d at 304.
74. See Flagler v. U.S. Attorney, No. 06-3699 (JAG), 2007 WL 2814657 (D.N.J.
Sept. 25, 2007) (challenging constitutionality of PASPA). See also Interactive Media
Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-1301 (GEB), 2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J.
Mar. 7, 2011) (challenging constitutionality of PASPA).
75. See Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *1 (listing claims asserted in plaintiff’s
complaint).
76. See Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *2-3 (dismissing case for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction). See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 555
(1992) (holding that in order for plaintiff to maintain standing, they must show
(1) concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent; (2) injury
that is fairly traceable to defendant; and (3) likelihood that favorable decision will
redress injury).
77. See Holder, 2011 WL 802106, at * 1 (involving constitutional challenges to
PASPA).
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mond Lesniak filed an action in federal District Court against
United States Attorney General Eric Holder challenging the consti-
tutionality of PASPA and seeking declaratory judgment.78  The
President of the New Jersey Senate, Stephen Sweeney, later filed an
Intervener Complaint.79  Plaintiffs asserted that PASPA was a viola-
tion of several laws, including: the Commerce Clause; the First
Amendment freedoms of expression and assembly; the Tenth
Amendment; the Eleventh Amendment; the substantive and proce-
dural protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments; and the Equal Protection Clause.80
The court ultimately determined that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate injury-in-fact and redressability and, as a result, failed
to establish proper standing to mount a constitutional challenge
against PASPA.81  The District Court acknowledged the New Jersey
legislature’s efforts to place a voter referendum on the ballot, ena-
bling the State to amend its constitution to authorize sports wager-
ing, but noted that Senators Sweeney and Lesniak were
prospectively attempting “to bypass PASPA’s preemptive force.”82
Nonetheless, the court stated, “[t]o the extent that PASPA dimin-
ishes state authority over sports gambling, it injures state sover-
eignty, not legislative sovereignty.”83  The plaintiffs lacked standing
to challenge the constitutionality of PASPA on Tenth Amendment
grounds because such claims are reserved only for States and New
Jersey was not a party to the action.84
78. See id. (listing organizations and individuals involved in case asserting con-
stitutional challenge to PASPA).  iMEGA is a “New Jersey non-profit corporation
that disseminates information regarding electronic gaming via the Internet, and
has members that provide Internet gambling services.” See id.
79. See id. at *3 (detailing filing of Intervener Complaint by New Jersey Sena-
tor Stephen Sweeney).
80. See id. at *5 (requesting Court find PASPA unconstitutional and perma-
nently enjoin its enforcement).
81. See id. at *3-6 (holding alleged injuries and redressability were
speculative).
82. See id. at *10 (stating Senators Sweeney and Lesniak were not defending
enacted state law).  At the time of the lawsuit, the New Jersey legislature agreed to
place a legislative-referred constitutional amendment regarding the legalization of
sports gambling on the ballot for voter approval in the November 2011 election.
See The Associated Press, supra note 22 (discussing proposed voter referendum). R
83. See Holder, 2011 WL 802106, at *10 (describing reasons for plaintiffs’ lack
of standing).
84. See id. at *8 (disagreeing with plaintiffs’ argument).  Plaintiffs argued that
private party standing for Tenth Amendment claims are not foreclosed “where a
federal law denies access to local political processes, and . . . that Senators Sweeney
and Lesniak have standing . . . to challenge the constitutionality of a statute where
the Governor or his representatives have declined to do so.” See id.
13
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D. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
Challengers in both Markell and Holder claimed PASPA violated
the Tenth Amendment.85  Parties challenging federal statutes and
regulatory programs on Tenth Amendment grounds often invoke
the anti-commandeering doctrine, which the Supreme Court an-
nounced in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States.86
This doctrine prevents Congress from commandeering the states
into performing the work of federal officials.87
In New York, the challenged law was the the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Amendments Act, which required the states to
provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their
borders.88  This statute included incentives for the states and also
included a controversial provision that required states to “take title”
to waste that was not properly disposed of by a certain date set by
Congress.89  Further, the state would be “liable for all damages di-
rectly or indirectly incurred . . . as a consequence of the failure of
the State to take possession of the waste.”90  The Court held that the
“take title” provision was unconstitutional since it impermissibly
“commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the States by directly
85. See Flagler v. U.S. Attorney, No. 06-3699 (JAG), 2007 WL 2814657 (D.N.J.
Sept. 25, 2007) (challenging constitutionality of PASPA on Tenth Amendment
grounds). See also Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, No. 09-
1301 (GEB), 2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (challenging constitutionality
of PASPA on Tenth Amendment grounds).
86. See Matthew D. Adlera and Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 76-77 (1998) (discussing anti-
commandeering doctrine).  A federal law or regulatory scheme violates anti-com-
mandeering principles if:
[T]he requirement commandeers state officials, rather than merely pre-
empting state law; it does so directly rather than as a condition for federal
spending, or for nonpreemption of state law; the requirement is targeted
at state officials, rather than being generally applicable to state officials
and private persons alike; the officials commandeered are exercising leg-
islative or executive rather than judicial functions; and the requirement is
grounded in the Commerce Clause or Congress’s other Article I powers,
rather than in the grants of power to Congress in the Reconstruction
Amendments.
See id.
87. See generally New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 144 (1992) (striking down
take-title provision of federal waste law because law required States to enact regula-
tory program and expend resources in taking title to waste). See generally Printz v.
U.S., 521 U.S. 898, 898 (1997) (holding that “Congress cannot . . . conscript[t] the
State’s officers directly”).  In Printz, the Court invalidated the provision of the
Brady Act that required local authorities to run background checks on persons
seeking to purchase guns. See id. at 935.
88. See New York, 505 U.S. at 151-52 (discussing Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act).
89. See id.
90. See id. at 153-54 (discussing “take title” provision imposed on states).
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compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.”91
In Printz, the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
compelled state and local law enforcement officers to conduct
background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.92  Relying
on anti-commandeering principles, the Court invalidated the stat-
ute because it impermissibly required state executive officials “to
administer a federally enacted regulatory scheme.”93  The Court
emphasized that “Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the State’s officers directly.”94
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Standing Issues
New Jersey asserted Congress exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment and, accordingly, re-
quested that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit find PASPA unconstitutional.95  Before the Third Circuit ruled
on the merits, the court first reviewed whether the Leagues had
standing to bring the action.96  New Jersey averred the Leagues
could not “show a concrete, non-speculative injury from any poten-
tial increase in legal gambling.”97  Unlike the District Court, the
Third Circuit did not rely on Markell for its standing analysis since
the Third Circuit did not explicitly consider Article III standing in
that case.98  Thus, the Circuit Court applied the following three-
part test to establish standing:
91. See id. at 176 (holding “take title” provision unconstitutional because it
required states to implement federal regulatory program (citing Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))).
92. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 903 (describing requirements imposed on state
“chief law enforcement officers”).
93. See id. at 935 (holding law unconstitutional since Congress cannot “com-
mand the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program”).
94. Id. (reaffirming that Congress cannot commandeer states into performing
its own work).
95. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 214-15 (addressing claims asserted by New Jersey
in its appeal to Third Circuit).
96. See id. at 217-24 (reviewing whether leagues demonstrated proper
standing).
97. See id. at 218 (discussing New Jersey’s counterarguments to Leagues’
claims that they satisfied standing requirements).
98. See id.  (“In Markell we ‘beg[a]n [our analysis], as always, by considering
whether we ha[d] jurisdiction to hear [the] appeal,’ and later concluded that we
did have jurisdiction . . . . But, contrary to the Leagues’ suggestion, our analysis was
limited to whether we had appellate jurisdiction.” (fifth alteration added)).
15
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[A] plaintiff must show (1) an ‘injury in fact,’ i.e., an actu-
ally or imminently threatened injury that is ‘concrete and
particularized’ to the plaintiff; (2) causation, i.e., traceabil-
ity of the injury to the actions of the defendant; and (3)
redressability of the injury by a favorable decision by the
Court.99
Relying on Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ.,100 the
court determined the Leagues satisfied the causation and redres-
sability requirements.101  The court accepted the Leagues’ concern
that the law “[would] result in a taint upon their games, and is a law
that by definition constitutes state action to license conduct that
would not otherwise occur.”102
Next, the court focused on the injury-in-fact requirement.103
The Third Circuit agreed with the Leagues’ claims “that the Sports
Wagering Law makes the Leagues’ games the object of state-li-
censed gambling and they will suffer reputational harm if such ac-
tivity expands.”104  The circuit court acknowledged the Leagues’
claims were “not a generalized grievance,” and the Sports Wagering
Law “aim[ed] to license private individuals to cultivate the fruits of
the Leagues’ labor.”105  Since the law threatened to cause the
Leagues reputational harm, the Circuit Court determined that such
“reputational harm is a cognizable injury in fact.”106
99. See id. (discussing three-part test to establish standing (citing Summers v.
Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009))).
100. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 930 (D.C.
Cir. 2004).
101. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 218-19  (finding Leagues established causation
and redressability (citing Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 940-41)).
102. See id. at 218 (discussing reasoning for finding causation and redres-
sability prongs were satisfied).
103. See id. at 219 (analyzing legal components required to establish injury-in-
fact).
104. See id. (addressing Leagues’ claims).
105. See id. (discussing Leagues’ claims).
We thus hesitate to conclude that the Leagues may rely solely on the exis-
tence of the Sports Wagering Law to show injury.  But that is not to say
that we are glib with respect to one of the main purposes of the law: to
use the Leagues’ games for profit.
Id. The court also highlighted that “[i]njury-in-fact may be established when the
plaintiff himself is the object of the action at issue.” See id. (citing Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
106. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 220-22 (suggesting evidence in record supports
conclusion that reputational harm will occur).  The Circuit Court asserted that the
law threatened to cause the Leagues reputational harm due to the “unwanted and
stigmatizing label” resulting from the Leagues’ unwelcome association with gam-
bling. See id. at 221.
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B. PASPA is Within Congress’ Commerce Clause Power
After establishing the Leagues satisfied the requirements for
standing, the Third Circuit addressed the merits of the case.107
However, before the Circuit Court addressed anti-commandeering
and equal sovereignty principles, it first examined whether Con-
gress could even regulate sports gambling under the Commerce
Clause.108  Relying on United States v. Lopez,109 the Circuit Court
concluded that Congress did not exceed its powers under the Com-
merce Clause in its regulation of sports gambling because sports
wagering and the sporting events carried out by the Leagues, con-
sidered separately or together, substantially affect interstate com-
merce.110  The Circuit Court made three determinations in
accordance with this finding: first, “both wagering and national
sports are economic activities;” second, “the professional and ama-
teur sporting events at the heart of the Leagues’ operations ‘sub-
stantially affect’ interstate commerce;” and third, “it immediately
follows that placing wagers on sporting events also substantially af-
fects interstate commerce” since the effects of gambling on sporting
events “will plainly transcend state boundaries and affect a funda-
mentally national industry.”111  Further, the Circuit Court relied on
Gonzales v. Raich,112 and held that PASPA does not unconstitution-
ally regulate purely local activities because Congress had a rational
107. For a discussion of the merits of the case, see infra notes 108 to 146 and R
accompanying text.
108. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 224 (“Only after concluding that Congress may
[regulate sports wagering] can we consider whether, in exercising its affirmative
powers, Congress exceed[ed] a limitation imposed in the Constitution, such as by
the anti-commandeering and equal sovereignty principles.”).
109. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995).
110. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 224-26 (“Congress may regulate an activity that
‘substantially affects interstate commerce’ if [the activity] ‘arise[s] out of or [is]
connected with a commercial transaction.’” (second and third alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559)).
111. See id. at 224-25 (listing three reasons why sports gambling and sporting
events substantially affect interstate commerce).  “A wager is simply a contingent
contract involving ‘two or more . . . parties, having mutual rights in respect to the
money or other thing wagered.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Las Vegas
Hacienda, Inc. v. Gibson, 359 P.2d 85, 86 (Nev. 1961)).  “[T]he operations of the
Leagues are economic activities, as they preside essentially over for-profit en-
tertainment.” Id. at 225 (describing economic activities engaged in by Leagues).
“The Leagues are associations comprised of thousands of clubs and members,
which in turn govern the operations of thousands of sports teams organized across
the United States, competing for fans and revenue across the country.” Id.  Ameri-
cans gamble up to $500 billion on sports each year. Id. (discussing report provided
by New Jersey).
112. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 1 (2005).
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basis to conclude that sports gambling regimes, while effectuated
within state boarders, substantially affect interstate commerce.113
C. PASPA Does Not Commandeer the States
Next, the Third Circuit addressed New Jersey’s argument that
PASPA violates the anti-commandeering principle, which prohibits
Congress from forcing the states “into doing the work of federal
officials.”114  First, the Circuit Court addressed situations where
Congress passed laws granting the States the choice to adopt fed-
eral standards or to participate in a federal regulatory program.115
Thus, when the law does not coerce the States into enacting or im-
plementing federal standards, there is no Tenth Amendment viola-
tion.116  Referencing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass’n,117 the court stated the Tenth Amendment does not pose any
obstacles “to a system by which Congress ‘chose to allow the States a
regulatory role’” in what is “an otherwise pre-empt[ible] field.”118
Second, the Circuit Court addressed circumstances where the
Supreme Court upheld affirmative prohibitions on state action,
which had the effect of invalidating contrary state laws.119  The
court referenced South Carolina v. Baker,120 where the Supreme
Court upheld a law that directly regulated the States by prohibiting
the issuance of bearer bonds.121  The Circuit Court noted the law in
Baker did not “seek to control or influence the manner in which
113. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 226 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 22) (concluding
New Jersey’s argument that PASPA unlawfully regulates purely local activities is
meritless).
114. See id. at 227 (addressing New Jersey’s argument that PASPA impermissi-
bly commandeers state governments and officials).  For a detailed discussion of the
anti-commandeering doctrine and its application to federal laws and regulations
violating state sovereignty, see supra notes 85 to 94 and accompanying text. R
115. See id. at 227-28 (outlining cases upholding laws as permissible regula-
tions in a pre-emptible field).
116. See id. at 228 (citing F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982))
(noting Congress can entirely pre-empt certain fields, yet leave room for States to
“maneuver”).
117. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 264
(1981).
118. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 228 (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 290; United States
v. Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 926 (1997)).
119. See id. at 228-29 (analyzing cases upholding permissible prohibitions on
state action).
120. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 505 (1988).
121. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 228 (noting law where Congress prohibited state
action and private action (citing Baker, 485 U.S. at 511)).
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States regulate private parties,” but “simply ‘subjected a State to the
same legislation applicable to private parties.’”122
Further, the Circuit Court noted Reno v. Condon,123 where the
Supreme Court rejected an anti-commandeering challenge to the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”), which prevented States
from disclosing any “personal information obtained by state depart-
ments of motor vehicles.”124  In Reno, the Supreme Court held the
DPPA was constitutional since it did not “require States in their sov-
ereign capacity to regulate their own citizens.”125  The Circuit Court
acknowledged PASPA was similar to the prohibitions on state action
in Baker and Reno.126  However, the court suggested the following
reasoning:
[T]o the extent PASPA makes it unattractive for states to
repeal their anti-sports wagering laws, which in turn re-
quires enforcement by states, the effort PASPA requires is
simply that the states enforce the laws they choose to
maintain, and is therefore plainly less intrusive than the
laws in Baker and Reno.127
Moreover, the Circuit Court rejected New Jersey’s claims that
Reno and Baker are inapposite, concluding that PASPA “prohibits
the issuance of [sports wagering] licenses all together, as in Baker,
where the state was essentially prohibited from issuing bearer
bonds.”128
Third, the court addressed the two occasions where the Su-
preme Court invalidated laws as a result of impermissible comman-
deering.129  In order for a state to prevail on an anti-
commandeering challenge, the state must show that Congress has
“commandeered the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram,” which may come in the form of forcing the States to expend
122. See id. (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 160).
123. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 141 (2000).
124. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 228 (drawing comparison to PASPA since provi-
sions in PASPA prohibit States from taking action (citing Reno, 528 U.S. at 150)).
125. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 (suggesting “DPPA regulates the States as the
owners of data bases” and “does not require state officials to . . . enforce[ ] . . .
federal statutes regulating private individuals”).
126. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 234 (suggesting similarities among laws).
127. See id. (stating PASPA is less intrusive than laws at issue in Baker and
Reno).
128. See id. at 235 (concluding PASPA is no different than legislative scheme
imposed in Baker).
129. See id. at 229 (contrasting PASPA with two cases where Supreme Court
invalidated laws based on anti-commandeering claims).
19
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resources in carrying out a program or requiring state officials to
administer federal law.130  The Circuit Court ultimately rejected
New Jersey’s anti-commandeering claims, noting only two occasions
where the Supreme Court invalidated laws under the doctrine, both
distinguishable from PASPA.131  Specifically, “PASPA does not re-
quire or coerce the states to lift a finger—they are not required to
pass laws, to take title to anything, to conduct background checks,
to expend any funds, or to in any way enforce federal law.”132  As a
result, the court emphasized that, by enacting PASPA, Congress did
not impose affirmative requirements on the states to act, but rather
set forth a mere prohibition.133
Last, the court addressed New Jersey’s claim that PASPA im-
poses an affirmative requirement on the states by forcing them to
act, specifically by preventing the states from repealing state bans
on sports wagering.134  The Circuit Court again rejected New
Jersey’s claim since PASPA does not require the states to maintain
their current sports wagering bans, but rather, “all that is prohib-
ited is the issuance of gambling ‘license[s]’ or the affirmative
‘authoriz[ation] by law’ of gambling schemes.”135  Additionally, the
court noted the New Jersey Legislature had to propose a constitu-
tional amendment repealing a ban on sports wagering and have it
subsequently authorized by law.136  This, the court explained,
would undermine New Jersey’s claim “that the amendment alone
was sufficient to affirmatively authorize sports wagering.”137
130. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 227 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 283, 288). See
generally New York, 505 U.S. at 144 (striking down take-title provision of federal
waste law because law required States to enact regulatory program and expend
resources in taking title to waste); Printz, 521 U.S. at 898 (invalidating provision of
Brady Act requiring local authorities to run background checks on persons seeking
to purchase guns).
131. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 227  (distinguishing PASPA from two laws previ-
ously struck down under anti-commandeering principles (citing New York, 505
U.S. at 144, 166, 180)).
132. See id. at 231 (stating PASPA is “[u]nlike the problematic ‘take title’ pro-
vision and the background check requirements” invalidated under anti-comman-
deering principles).
133. See id. at 231-32 (distinguishing between prohibition and conscripting
States to take affirmative actions).
134. See id. at 232 (recognizing New Jersey’s attempt to draw distinction be-
tween affirmative and negative commands).
135. See id. (alterations in original) (“PASPA speaks only of ‘authorizing by
law’ a sport gambling scheme.”).
136. See id. (noting enactment of Sports Wagering Law, in addition to consti-
tutional amendment, was crucial to authorizing sports wagering).
137. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 232-33 (suggesting Court must adhere to statu-
tory construction “that does not raise a series of constitutional problems”).  Con-
gress, through the passage of PASPA, sought to “reach private activity only to the
20
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D. PASPA Does Not Violate Equal Sovereignty of the States
Finally, the Third Circuit addressed New Jersey’s claim that
PASPA “violates the equal sovereignty of the states by singling out
Nevada for preferential treatment and allowing only that State to
maintain broad state-sponsored sports gambling.”138  New Jersey di-
rected the Circuit Court’s attention to two cases analyzing Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”).139  In response, the Cir-
cuit Court distinguished the VRA from PASPA by pointing out fun-
damental differences; specifically that, regulating gambling and
voting are “not of the same nature” since elections, as intended by
the Framers, are to be regulated by the states.140  Moreover, the
court noted the equal sovereignty principle does not apply “outside
the context of ‘sensitive areas of state and local policymaking.’”141
Additionally, the Circuit Court concluded Congress enacted
PASPA to stop the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling.142
Consequently, the court explained that PASPA sufficiently ad-
dressed that problem by targeting states where sports gambling did
not exist.143  Unlike the VRA, PASPA does not “singl[e] out a hand-
ful of states for disfavored treatment,” but rather “treats more favora-
bly a single state.”144  As a result, the Circuit Court noted that New
Jersey was not seeking an invalidation of only PASPA’s grandfather
extent that it is conducted ‘pursuant to state law.’” Id. at 233 (stating Congress
acknowledged difference between sports gambling by private parties and sports
gambling “which occurs under the auspices of state approval and authorization”).
138. See id. at 237 (addressing New Jersey’s equal sovereignty claims.)
139. See id. at 237-38 (stating that “centerpiece of Appellants’ equal sover-
eignty argument is the Supreme Court’s analysis of the Voting Rights Act of
1965”). See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c (2006) (prohibiting certain jurisdictions from
making changes to practices and procedures affecting voting laws without first get-
ting preclearance).  Currently, eight states are “covered” jurisdictions under Sec-
tion 5 of the Voting Rights Act. See Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, JUSTICE.GOV,
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php (last visited Feb. 23,
2013) (listing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Texas, and Virginia as subject to Section 5 requirements).
140. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 238 (stating “VRA is fundamentally different
from PASPA”).
141. See id. at 239 (claiming equal sovereignty principle does not apply to reg-
ulation of gambling (citing Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624
(2013))).
142. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 239 (stating “true purpose” of PASPA is “to stop
the spread of state-sanctioned sports gambling). See also S. Rep. No. 102-248, supra
note 51, at 5 (suggesting PASPA was enacted to prevent the proliferation of sports R
gambling).
143. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 239 (concluding PASPA is “precisely tailored to
address” an increase in state-sanctioned sports gambling).
144. See id. (distinguishing VRA from PASPA).
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provision, but that the state sought Nevada’s favorable treatment.145
This finding ultimately “undermine[d] [New Jersey]’[s] invocation
of the equal sovereignty doctrine.”146
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
As a result of finding PASPA did not violate the Tenth Amend-
ment, the Third Circuit construed the legal authority too narrowly,
specifically in its interpretation of the legal principles set forth in
New York and Printz.147  In its analysis, the Third Circuit narrowly
relied on the affirmative requirements implicated in the statutes at
issue in New York and Printz.148  As a result, the court found that
Congress did not infringe on the states’ sovereignty since PASPA
does not impose affirmative requirements on the States.149  How-
ever, as Judge Vanaskie noted in his dissent, “[n]othing in New York
or Printz . . . limited the principles of federalism . . . to situations in
which Congress directed affirmative activity on part of the states.”150
In New York, for example, the Court stated, “the Framers explicitly
chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regu-
late individuals, not States.”151  Furthermore, the Court reiterated
the following:
[W]here Congress has the authority under the Constitu-
tion to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it
lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit
those acts . . . . [T]he allocation of power contained in the
Commerce Clause . . . authorizes Congress to regulate in-
145. See id. (suggesting New Jersey, under its equal sovereignty claim, sought
to obtain same treatment as Nevada).
146. See id. (noting “[t]hat New Jersey seeks Nevada’s preferential treatment,
and not a complete ban on preferences, undermines Appellants’ invocation of the
equal sovereignty doctrine.”).
147. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of whether PASPA violates
the Tenth Amendment, see supra notes 114 to 137 and accompanying text. R
148. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of New York and Printz, see
supra notes 129 to 130 and accompanying text. R
149. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis regarding the lack of af-
firmative requirements in PASPA, see supra notes 134 to 137 and accompanying R
text.
150. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 245 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (stating statutes
under review in New York and Printz imposed affirmative requirements on states,
but anti-commandeering principle is not limited to only those types of statutes).
151. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
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terstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to
regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.152
The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the peo-
ple.”153  Lotteries, gaming, and sweepstakes have traditionally been
left to the States to regulate.154  Currently, forty-four states, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have lotteries, and each state’s
regulation of those lotteries varies widely.155  Since PASPA prohibits
states from “licens[ing], or authoriz[ing] by law or compact . . . [a]
lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme based” on a sports competition, it has the effect of prescrib-
ing how states must regulate their gambling schemes, and thus, in-
terstate commerce.156  Broadly interpreted, PASPA conflicts with
the anti-commandeering principles set forth in New York and
Printz.157
Moreover, in New York, the Court stressed that when Congress
is allowed to commandeer the states, state governments and offi-
cials would be held politically accountable for decisions and actions
152. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 245 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (arguing federal-
ism principles must include Congress’ ability to compel States to prohibit acts (cit-
ing New York, 505 U.S. at 166)).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
154. See S. Rep. No. 102-248, supra note 51, at 12 (addressing concerns over R
federalism issues implicated by enacting PASPA); Woo, supra note 44, at 578 (stat- R
ing that virtually all forms of gambling, outside of sports wagering, “are solely state-
regulated” in the United States).  See generally About the New York State Gaming
Commission, NYS GAMING COMMISSION, http://www.gaming.ny.gov/about/ (last
visited Feb. 25, 2014) (stating “New York State Gaming Commission regulates all
aspects of gaming and gambling activity in the state, including horse racing and
pari-mutuel wagering, Class III Indian Gaming, the state lottery (including video
lottery terminals) and charitable gaming.”); Expanded Gaming Act, MASSACHU-
SETTS GAMING COMMISSION, http://massgaming.com/about/expanded-gaming-
act/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2014) (outlining measures implemented by Massachu-
setts’s Expanded Gaming Act).
155. See Lotteries and Sweepstakes, ANSWER.USA.GOV, http://www.usa.gov/
Topics/Lottery-Results.shtml (last visited Feb. 25, 2015) (providing information on
state lotteries and state gambling laws).
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006); NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 245 (Vanaskie, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting “PASPA dictates the manner in which states must regulate
interstate commerce”). See also Woo, supra note 44, at 578 (noting “[g]iven this R
state tradition of self-regulating gambling activity within their borders, a statute
like PASPA appears to intrude upon a right protected under the Tenth
Amendment.”).
157. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 245 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (stating “PASPA
contravenes the principles of federalism set forth in New York and Printz,” and
“[w]hether stated as a command to engage in specific action or a prohibition
against specific action, the federal government’s interference with a state’s sover-
eign autonomy is the same.”).
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not within their control.158  Thus, there are instances where Con-
gress could escape accountability by forcing policy decisions onto
the states for which state governments, officials, and citizens have
no responsibility and might even oppose.159  Congress made the de-
cision not to directly regulate or ban sports gambling altogether,
but “passed the responsibility to the states . . . which . . . may not
authorize or issue state licenses for such activities.”160  Thus, PASPA
has the effect of blurring the lines of political accountability.161
A majority of the states have lotteries and have legalized vari-
ous forms of gambling.162  As a result, these states have also imple-
mented their own gambling regulatory schemes.163  Citizens of
these states are aware of not only the various gambling regulations
existing in their respective states, but also of the benefits gambling
regimes provide since revenues generated from such regimes fi-
nance a variety of state programs.164  As more Americans are aware
of the existence of sports gambling, especially due to the media
attention surrounding widespread betting on the Super Bowl, citi-
zens of the forty-six other states (those not granted an exemption
under PASPA) may misplace blame on their state officials for not
enacting a state-sanctioned sports gambling scheme.165  Moreover,
New Jersey citizens who voted to repeal a constitutional ban on
sports wagering are likely to place blame on New Jersey officials
158. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 330
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 4th ed. 2011) (explaining “states would take the
political heat” for decisions made by Congress and not the states themselves).
159. See id. at 330-31 (suggesting Congress undermines government accounta-
bility when Congress is allowed to commandeer states).
160. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 246 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (stating Congress
has shifted accountability of federal officials to state officials).
161. See Brief for States of West Virginia as Amici Curiae in Support of Rever-
sal, NCAA v. N.J., 730 F.3d 280 (2013) (No. 13-1713) (suggesting “Supreme Court
has stressed that maintaining clear lines of political accountability is the touch-
stone of the anti-commandeering doctrine.”).
162. See Lotteries and Sweepstakes, supra note 155 (noting 44 states, D.C., Pu- R
erto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands have lotteries and providing links to those
lotteries).
163. See Woo, supra note 44, at 578 (declaring “[s]tates have the power to R
conduct their own lotteries, create racetracks, and establish commercial casinos
free from federal intervention.”).
164. See The Associated Press, Powerball, Mega Millions Give State Budgets a Lift,
CBS DFW (Feb. 24, 2014, 4:39PM), http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2014/02/24/power
ball-mega-millions-give-state-budgets-a-lift/ (“For every $2 ticket, 50 cents or more
might end up paying for police officers in Massachusetts, services for the elderly in
Pennsylvania, or education in rural school districts in Idaho, lottery directors
say.”); Lotteries and Sweepstakes, supra note 155 (listing lottery laws for each R
state).
165. See The Associated Press, supra note 7 (reporting record profits as result R
of wagering on Super Bowl XLVIII).
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when sports gambling licenses are not issued.166  Ultimately, how-
ever, Congress is the legislative body responsible for the lack of an
existing sports gambling regime in New Jersey.167
Additionally, the Third Circuit’s anti-commandeering analysis
presents a significant flaw since PASPA does not specifically set
forth a federal regulatory framework.168  Judge Vanaskie noted in
his dissent, “the majority opinion does not cite any case that sus-
tained a federal statute that purported to regulate the states under
the Commerce Clause where there was no underlying federal
scheme of regulation or deregulation.”169  The Third Circuit drew a
comparison between PASPA and the DPPA at issue in Reno, sug-
gesting that there were similarities between Congress’ direct regula-
tions of interstate commerce inherent in the laws.170  However,
unlike in Reno, PASPA is not itself a regulatory scheme, but rather
dictates how “States in their sovereign capacity . . . .  must regulate
sports gambling.”171  The States cannot provide a regulatory
scheme altogether.172  Moreover, the “DPPA regulates the States as
166. See Wittkowski, supra note 23 (reporting New Jersey voters, by a margin of R
2-to-1, approved referendum to legalize sports betting at Atlantic City casinos and
state’s horse-racing tracks).
167. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2006).
168. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006) (making it illegal for individuals and states to
engage in state-sanctioned sports gambling).  Rather than create a regulatory
scheme to enforce PASPA, Congress built in a provision granting standing to the
“Attorney General of the United States, or . . . professional sports organization or
amateur sports organization whose competitive game is alleged to be the basis of” a
violation of PASPA to enforce PASPA and enjoin a potential violator. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 3703 (2006) (setting forth standing requirements to file civil action).
169. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 246 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (suggesting “[i]f
Congress identifies a problem that falls within its realm of authority, it may provide
a federal solution directly itself or properly incentivize states to regulate or comply
with federal standards.”).
170. For a discussion of the comparison made between PASPA and the fed-
eral regulatory scheme implicated in Reno, see supra notes 124 to 127 and accom- R
panying text.
171. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 249 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (citations omitted) (suggesting “PASPA does require states in
their sovereign capacity to regulate their citizens” which contravenes principle set
forth in Reno).
172. See id. at 249 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (stating PASPA only sets “federal
parameters as to how states may regulate sports gambling”).
I agree with my colleagues that Congress has the authority under the
Commerce Clause to ban gambling on sporting events, and that such a
ban could include state-licensed gambling. I part company with my col-
leagues because that is not what PASPA does. Instead, PASPA conscripts
the states as foot soldiers to implement a congressional policy choice that
wagering on sporting events should be prohibited to the greatest extent
practicable. Contrary to the majority’s view, the Supremacy Clause simply
does not give Congress the power to tell the states what they can and
cannot do in the absence of a validly-enacted federal regulatory or der-
25
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the owners of databases,” and as a result, the Court in Reno treated
the states as market participants.173  However, PASPA regulates the
states as states, meaning their capacity to regulate their own citi-
zens.174  Thus, PASPA has the effect of impermissibly comman-
deering the states.175
The Third Circuit also relied on Hodel in its analysis to support
its conclusion that Congress may impose regulatory requirements
on the states.176  The federal statute at issue in Hodel did not violate
the Tenth Amendment since the states had a choice of whether to
adopt federal standards or to participate in a federal program regu-
lating surface coal mining.177  However, since PASPA prohibits the
states from issuing sports gambling licenses, without the ability to
make a choice at all, the comparison to the regulatory regime in
Hodel is generally inapplicable.178
VI. IMPACT
The Third Circuit’s decision in NCAA demonstrates the courts’
unwillingness to extend the anti-commandeering principles beyond
the narrow holdings of New York and Printz.179  As a result, Congress
has the ability to pass similar prohibitions, without fear of having
the laws overturned by the courts on Tenth Amendment
egulatory scheme . . .  there is no federal regulatory or deregulatory
scheme on the matter of sports wagering. Instead, there is the congres-
sional directive that states not allow it.
Id. at 245 n.3.
173. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 151 (“The DPPA regulates the universe of entities
that participate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information—the
States as initial suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private
resellers or redisclosers of that information in commerce.”).
174. See Brief for States of West Virginia, supra note 161, at 19-20 (drawing R
distinction between DPPA and PASPA).
175. See id. (stating “[i]f anything, [Reno] supports the notion that Congress
impermissibly commandeers even where it prohibits State action.”).
176. For a discussion of the Third Circuit’s reliance on Hodel, see supra notes
115 to 118 and accompanying text. R
177. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
288 (1981) (“If a State does not wish to submit a proposed permanent program
that complies with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory bur-
den will be borne by the Federal Government.”).
178. See id. at 288; NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 250 (Vanaskie, J., dissenting) (stating
PASPA might be constitutional if it provides states with choice “to either imple-
ment state regulation of sports gambling that met federal standards or allow fed-
eral regulation to take effect”).
179. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 240 (“Extending [anti-commandeering] princi-
ples as [New Jersey] propose[s] would result in significant changes to the day-to-
day operation of the Supremacy Clause in our constitutional structure.”).  For a
discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis of the anti-commandeering doctrine as
applied to PAPSA, see supra notes 114 to 137 and accompanying text. R
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grounds.180  For example, as studies continue to show that athletes
have the potential to face long-term health risks resulting from re-
peated concussions in sporting events, Congress may feel pressure
to enact legislation attempting to reduce or prevent instances of
concussions in athletes, specifically youth athletes.181  Rather than
enforce a scheme at the national level, Congress could prohibit
States from authorizing or licensing sports programs involving
young athletes.182  Under the Third Circuit’s analysis, this statutory
scheme would survive a constitutional challenge under the Tenth
Amendment.183
Most importantly, the Third Circuit’s decision maintains the
status quo regarding state-sanctioned sports wagering in the United
States.184  While New Jersey placed its final bets on the Supreme
Court hoping the Court would hear the case and strike down
PASPA, the Court ultimately intimated that the odds were not in
New Jersey’s favor by declining to hear the case.185  Until the Su-
preme Court agrees to hear a case implicating the constitutional
concerns underlying PASPA, and rules in a challenger’s favor, the
law remains the sole obstacle for New Jersey, and all other states not
exempted from the law, to implement sports wagering schemes.186
180. See Brief for States of West Virginia, supra note 161, at 10-11 (stating law R
similar to PASPA would enable “Congress to pass laws that enact no federal regime
and simply restrict a State’s ability to issue licenses, permits, or authorizations.”).
181. See Symposium, “CONCUSSION CONUNDRUM”: PANELS 2 & 3, 20 JEF-
FREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 347, 347 (2013) (discussing impact of concussions on
athletes).  Concussions “happen to all athletes of all ages and all levels whether it’s
amateur, semi-pro, or pro and they happen of course outside of the sporting arena
as well, but no athlete is immune from the risks of concussion.” See id. at 350
(noting athletes are subject to concussions in both contact and non-contact
sports); see also State Laws and Regulations for Camps, AMERICAN CAMP ASS’N,
http://www.acacamps.org/publicpolicy/regulations (last visited Mar. 12, 2014)
(suggesting camps in various states require licenses and permits to operate).
182. See Brief for States of West Virginia, supra note 161, at 14 (suggesting R
Congress, in an effort to divert blame, could prohibit States from authorizing or
licensing youth football leagues).
183. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 240-41 (holding PASPA’s prohibition of state-
sanctioned sports gambling schemes valid under Tenth Amendment).
184. See id. (holding PASPA constitutional).
185. See Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014) (denying writ of certiorari);
see Christie v. NCAA, 2014 WL 572929, petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Feb. 12, 2014)
(No. 13-967) (requesting United States Supreme Court grant petition for certio-
rari); see also Matt Friedman, N.J.’s Gamble on Sports Betting is $2.3M and Counting, NJ
.COM (Dec. 30, 2013, 8:51AM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/12/
states_gamble_on_sports_betting_is_23_million_and_counting.html (stating New
Jersey has spent $2.3 million on its legal challenge of PASPA).
186. For a discussion of PASPA and its impact on the states, see supra notes 51 R
to 59 and accompanying text. R
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As the effects of the recent economic downturn are still felt by
individuals all over the country, state governments, too, are feeling
its effects since they are consistently burdened with budget
shortfalls.187  Low tax revenues have largely contributed to the
budget gaps of many states.188  In order to raise revenues and close
budget gaps, states have sought to enact sports wagering laws seek-
ing to tax the profits realized by gambling entities.189  However,
PASPA, as is stands, prevents states not exempted from the law from
enacting sports wagering schemes in an effort to close budget
shortfalls.190  Moreover, PASPA also prevents Delaware, Montana,
and Oregon from enacting sports wagering schemes that include
single-game betting on live sports outside of the NFL, and thus, se-
verely limits each states’ ability to increase revenues related to
sports gambling.191  Due in part to single-game sports gambling,
Nevada gambling entities realized $3.4 billion in profits in 2012,
$15 million of which was collected by the state in taxes.192  There-
fore, the Third Circuit’s decision has the effect of allowing Nevada
to continue to retain a monopoly over sports wagering.193
However, as the Third Circuit noted in its opinion, “New Jersey
and any other state that may wish to legalize gambling on sports
187. See Study: Illinois To See Continued Budget Shortfalls Despite Pension Reform,
PROGRESS ILLINOIS (Jan. 22, 2014, 2:09PM), http://www.progressillinois.com/
news/content/2014/01/22/study-illinois-see-continued-budget-shortfalls-despite-
pension-reform (reporting Illinois’ budget gap is expected to get larger despite
overhauling state programs).
188. See Phil Oliff, Chris Mai, and Vincent Palacios, States Continue to Feel Reces-
sion’s Impact, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Jun. 27, 2012), http://www
.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711 (reporting “[a]s of the first quarter of 2012, state
revenues remained 5.5 percent below pre-recession levels, and are not growing fast
enough to recover fully soon.”).
189. See Batley, supra note 8 (stating that in addition to New Jersey, Illinois R
and California have considered sports wagering laws to close budget shortfalls).
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).  Because PASPA prohibits the states from
implementing state-sanctioned licensing schemes, States are prevented from realiz-
ing revenues by taxing sports gambling profits. See id.
191. For a discussion of Delaware’s unsuccessful attempt to expand its sports
gambling regime from multi-game betting to include single-game sports betting,
see supra notes 60 to 73 and accompanying text. R
192. See Batley, supra note 8 (“Nevada, the gaming capital of the world, took R
in $3.4 billion last year alone from sports betting and $15 million of it was depos-
ited directly into state tax-revenue coffers.”).
193. See Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Betting Against the House (and Senate): The Case
of Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 KY. L.J. 163, 168
(2011) (suggesting Nevada has developed monopoly on sports wagering due to its
exemption in PASPA).  “Nevada is the only state where wagering on collegiate
sports could ever be legal because the other three exempted states [Delaware,
Montana, and Oregon] would be limited to offering wagering to the extent they
have in the past: multi-game wagers on NFL contests.” See id. (discussing Nevada’s
ability to reign in millions of dollars resulting from terms of PASPA).
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within their borders are not without redress.”194  States and gam-
bling entities can choose to lobby Congress to make changes to
PASPA or ultimately repeal the law.195  As the negative stigma asso-
ciated with sports gambling continues to dissipate, and as more fans
engage in the activity, both legally and illegally, PASPA’s underlying
premise may now be untenable.196  In fact, despite the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in NCAA, New Jersey may have finally called Con-
gress’s bluff.197
Joshua M. Peles*
194. See NCAA II, 730 F.3d at 240-41 (suggesting states could “invoke Con-
gress’s authority” to change PASPA).
195. See id. (implying states could lobby Congress to receive an exemption
from PASPA or repeal law).
196. See S. Rep. No. 102-248, supra note 51, at 4-5 (stating purpose of PASPA is R
“to maintain the integrity” of professional and amateur sports). See James Vlahos,
The Super Bowl of Sports Gambling, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/magazine/the-super-bowl-of-sports-gambling.html?_
r=1 (reporting “[o]ne in five American men polled by researchers at Fairleigh
Dickinson University (and nearly one in 10 women) said they bet on sports in
2012”).  It is estimated between $80 billion and $380 billion is spent on illegal
gambling annually. See id. (citing statistics from National Gambling Impact Study
Commission, include a link (“available here”) to NGISC statistics, if possible).
197. For a discussion of states’ ability to invoke Congress’s authority, see supra
note 183 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. high dis-
tinction, The Pennsylvania State University, 2009.
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